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They called it the Reagan revolution….Ours was the first revolution in the 
history of mankind that truly reversed the course of government.
—Ronald Reagan, farewell address to the nation, January 11, 1989
If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to 
believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield 
the people from the political, economic, and/or military consequences of the lie.
—Unknown1
It is generally believed that the United States is a country of low 
taxes and small government, at least when compared with coun-
tries in Europe (and until the financial crisis so greatly expanded 
1. This quote is almost invariably attributed to Joseph Goebbels, but scholars of 
World War II have not been able to find any primary sources linking this quote 
to the German propaganda minister. Its true source is, therefore, unknown. See 
Bytwerk (2004).
the role of the federal government in the United States in late 
2008). Fully accounting for the role, size, and effect of the govern-
ment in an economy is a complex endeavor, however, and it is 
hardly  accomplished  by  repeatedly  restating  differences  in  top 
marginal tax rates, overall tax burdens, or gross sizes of govern-
ments in GDP terms. 
This  policy  brief  looks  beyond  the  alleged,  fundamental 
transatlantic differences between the United States and European 
countries in the role of government and the state-market trade-
off. Instead it focuses on the actual total flow of resources—both 
public and private—toward government tasks and social spending 
using a comprehensive method to control for the effects of US and 
European tax systems. 
In  so  doing,  this  policy  brief  shows  that,  when  properly 
measured, there is essentially no difference between the United 
States and European countries in the share of national economic 
output spent on either government tasks or social expenditures. 
In fact, this policy brief shows that the only meaningful difference 
between the United States and Europe is that US private-sector 
expenditures on healthcare dwarf private-sector healthcare expen-
ditures in European countries.
FOLLOW THE MONEY—STATE-MARKET TRADE-OFFS 
AND GOVERNMENT TASKS
One of the most frequently debated, alleged axiomatic differences 
in social and economic policy between Europe and the United 
States is in their total taxation levels. And it is beyond doubt that 
Europe has a far higher total tax burden than the United States.2 
The latest OECD data (figure 1) reveal that general government tax 
revenues amounted to 28 percent of US GDP in 2006. Meanwhile 
the EU-15 average was about 40 percent of GDP, with a high of 
just over 50 percent in Sweden, close to double the US total. 
At the same time, figure 1 shows that US and EU-15 nontax 
2. Tax burden is usually defined as the amount of compulsory transfers imposed 
by units of the general government sector (i.e., all levels of government: central/
federal, state, and local) on the rest of the economy. This policy brief will follow 
the demarcation of OECD revenue statistics and include all tax revenue and 
compulsory social security contributions. See IMF (2001) for details.
. All EU averages in this policy brief are weighted by countries’ nominal GDP 
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general government revenue—i.e., revenue from sources such 
as property income, rents and fees for the use of government 
land, dividends from other public entities, and fines and grants 
from other levels of government—are quite similar: Both are 
roughly 5 to 6 percent of GDP.4 This transatlantic similarity 
is also found in fiscal deficits: From 2000 to 2007 the average 
annual government deficit in the United States was 2.9 percent 
of GDP, precisely the same as in Italy and France and only 
marginally worse than the EU-15’s roughly 2 percent average 
annual deficit for the period (OECD 2008a, annex table 27). 
With similar nontax revenues and deficits, the United States 
and Europe differ only in terms of tax revenue.
However,  when  making  cross-country  comparisons,  a 
focus on tax rates alone is analytically unproductive. Taxes say 
little about real-world differences in government structure and, 
more importantly for the purposes of this policy brief, they are a 
very poor predictor of the amount of resources societies channel 
toward particular government and social purposes. 
A large part of the difference in total tax burden and conse-
4. The largest sources of nontax government revenues in the United States are 
state and local government revenues from federal grants, property income, 
and the sale of goods and services by state and local governments. Federal 
nontax government revenues are a relatively small part of the total. See OECD 
(2007a, table 198).
quently  reported  general  government  activity  levels  between 
European countries and the United States arises from the fact 
that in Europe the healthcare and educational sectors, includ-
ing  tertiary  education  and  universities,  are  overwhelmingly 
organized within the public sector, whereas in the United States 
the private sector provides a much larger share of these services. 
This general divergence remains despite rising private spending 
on healthcare and education in Europe in recent years and a 
general European movement toward US expenditure distribu-
tion in these two social policy areas (OECD 2008b, 2008c). 
As a result, a much more instructive metric of compari-
son is total expenditures on typically governmental functions, 
which combines total general government expenditures with 
total private-sector expenditures on healthcare and education. 
This sum provides the combined total expenditure of a country 
on typically governmental functions, irrespective of whether the 
spending entity is in the public or private sector.5 This compari-
son, as share of nominal GDP, is made with data from 2005 
5. The characterization of these services as “typically governmental functions” 
reflects two things: First, in most OECD countries—although of course not 
in the United States—both healthcare and education are overwhelmingly 
financed and provided by the government. Second, this terminology—admit-
tedly rather simplistically—assumes that general government outlays go only 
































Figure 1     General government tax and nontax revenue, 2006 (percent of GDP)
    Tax revenue
    Nontax revenue
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(the latest year available) in figure 2, with countries ranked by 
the combined total, which is shown in parentheses along the 
x-axis.
Figure 2 shows that, ignoring the sectoral classification of 
spending, total US expenditures on these typically governmental 
functions amount to nearly half of nominal GDP—47.4 percent 
in 2005. This total level of US spending is basically identical to 
average European total expenditure on these services—50 percent 
in the EU-14 and the eurozone. In other words, the share of total 
resources that the United States and European countries channel 
toward typically governmental functions is very similar.
In many respects, people convinced of the primacy of so-
called economic pocketbook issues over professed ideological 
convictions should welcome these similar levels of expenditure. 
Following  the  pocketbook  rule  would  predict  that  US  and 
European citizens—two large, relatively similar groups of aging 
people with roughly the same level of wealth—would demand 
that equal shares of their productive capacities be spent on the 
same typically governmental functions, regardless of whether 
they claim to be small-government Reaganites or traditional 
European social democrats.
Going further with the comparison, it is useful to compare, 
in isolation from other government expenditures, the total levels 
of expenditure on both education and healthcare in the United 
States and Europe (see boxes 1 and 2 on OECD definitions of 
expenditures on education and healthcare, respectively). Figure  
shows the most recent available data for both public and private 
expenditures on education and healthcare. As can be seen from 































Figure 2     Total expenditures on typically governmental functions, 2005
Note:  No data are available for Luxembourg. Countries are ranked by combined total, which is shown in parentheses. 
Sources:  OECD (008a, 008b, 008c).
    Total general government outlays
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The right-side stacked bars of figure  show that in 2005 
US public expenditures on healthcare were essentially equal to 
the European average, equaling about 7 percent of GDP. Thus 
despite having a healthcare system that is often described as 
being much more oriented to the private sector, the United States 
actually spends the same share of its GDP on public health-
care as Europe. Figure  shows clearly that the only significant 
difference between the United States and Europe on education 
and healthcare expenditures is in the level of private healthcare 
expenditures. The United States spends about three times more 
in 2005 were just below 5 percent of GDP, a level quite similar 
to that in Europe. Only the Scandinavian countries spent some-
what more on public education, while Greece and Slovakia spent 
a little less. In terms of private expenditures on education, the 
US 2005 level of 2. percent of GDP was clearly higher than 
that of any European country, but this was not enough to push 
total US education expenditure levels far above the European 
(EU-14) average. In 2005 the United States in total spent about 
1 percent more of GDP on education than did Europe on aver-
age but a little less than some of the Scandinavian countries.
Box 1     OECD definition of educational expenditure
The OECD defines educational expenditure in the following manner: Expenditure on educational institutions includes expendi-
ture on both instructional and non-instructional educational institutions. Instructional educational institutions are educational 
institutions which directly provide instructional programs (i.e. , teaching) to individuals directly in an organized group setting or 
through distance education. Business enterprises or other institutions providing short-term courses of training or instruction to 
individuals on a one-to-one basis are not included. Noninstructional educational institutions provide administrative, advisory or 
professional services to other educational institutions but do not enroll students themselves. Examples include national, state, 
and provincial ministries or departments of education; other bodies that administer education at various levels of government. 
Included are also financial and human resources invested in education or analogous bodies in the private sector; and organiza-
tions that provide education-related services as vocational or psychological counseling, placement, testing, financial aid to 
students, curriculum development, educational research, building operations and maintenance services, transport of students, 
and student meals and housing. This definition of institutions ensures that expenditure on services, which are provided in some 
OECD countries by schools and universities and in others by agencies other than schools, are covered on a comparable basis. 
Public expenditure includes public subsidies to households attributable for educational institutions, as well as including direct 
expenditure on educational institutions from international sources. Private expenditure is net of public subsidies attributable 
for educational institutions. 
Source: OECD (008b).
Box 2     OECD definition of healthcare expenditure
 The OECD defines total expenditure on health in the following manner: The sum of expenditure on activities that—through 
application of medical, paramedical, and nursing knowledge and technology—has the goals of: 1) Promoting health and 
preventing disease; ) Curing illness and reducing premature mortality; ) Caring for persons affected by chronic illness who 
require nursing care; ) Caring for persons with health-related impairments, disability, and handicaps who require nursing care; 
5) Providing and administering public health; and 6) Providing and administering health programs, health insurance and other 
funding arrangements. Included in public expenditure is health expenditure incurred by public funds. Public funds are state, re-
gional and local government bodies and social security schemes. Public capital formation on health includes publicly financed 
investment in health facilities plus capital transfers to the private sector for hospital construction and equipment. Included in 
private expenditure is the privately funded part of total health expenditure. Private sources of funds include out-of-pocket pay-
ments (both over-the-counter and cost-sharing), private insurance programs, charities and occupational health care. 
Source: OECD (008c). N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1                                                                                                          j aNu a r y   2 0 0 9
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on private healthcare than any European country, an amount of 
over 8 percentage points of (the larger) US GDP. As a result of 
this greater level of private healthcare expenditures, the United 
States spends greater than 50 percent more on healthcare than 
the EU-14 countries do on average. As such, it is a fair conclu-
sion that the only reason in expenditure terms that the United 
States has a more private-sector oriented healthcare system is 
that its healthcare system is far more expensive for the private 
sector than is the case in Europe. 
It may, of course, be argued that this difference, as well as the 
comparison of total expenditure levels on typically governmental 
functions found in figure 2, is somewhat of a red herring: Total 
expenditures on healthcare and typically governmental functions 
in general have politically been allowed to reach 15. and 47.4 
percent of GDP, respectively, in the United States precisely because 
a far greater share of these services is provided by the private sector 
than in European countries. Underpinning this argument would 
be the frequently displayed, deep-rooted political hostility in the 
United States toward so-called big government and the associ-
ated belief that private-sector expenditures are inherently more 
efficient than similar expenditures by the public sector. While 
this latter statement could be true, a brief comparison of health-
care and educational outcomes in the United States and Europe 
raises some fundamental questions about this statement’s validity, 
particularly whether it is empirically well-founded to have any a 
priori assumptions about the optimal state-market trade-off in 
delivering services in these two sectors (see box  on page 8).
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TRUE LEVELS OF  SOCIAL 
EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
Combining total government outlays with private-sector expen-
ditures on education and healthcare is probably too crude a 
measure for analyzing the domestic social institutions pertinent 
to any discussion of meaningful differences between the United 
States and Europe. A more useful analytic concept is that of 
social  expenditures.  Most  would  probably  agree  that  differ-
ent social expenditure levels and the resultant levels of social 
transfers and redistribution are what ultimately epitomize any 







































Figure 3     Public and private expenditures on education and healthcare, 2005
a.  No data are available for Luxembourg.  
Sources:  OECD (008b, 008c).
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the true difference between Mars and Venus, as Robert Kagan 
called the United States and Europe in his 200 book Of Para-
dise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, one 
would have to look at social expenditure.
Fortunately, the OECD now collects data on social expen-
ditures that allow for a detailed comparison between the United 
States and Europe in this area. The standard OECD definition 
of “social spending” is: 
The  provision  by  public  and  private  institutions  of 
benefits  to,  and  financial  contributions  targeted  at, 
households and individuals in order to provide support 
during  circumstances  which  adversely  affect  their 
welfare,  provided  that  the  provision  of  the  benefits 
and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct 
payment for a particular good or service nor an indi-
vidual contract or transfer.6
According to the OECD’s Social Expenditure Database 
(SOCX), gross public social expenditures in the United States 
amounted to 15.9 percent of nominal GDP in 2005 (the most 
recent  available  data).  This  was  about  10  percentage  points 
less than the EU average and only slightly more than half the 
level in the highest spending country, Sweden, at 29.4 percent 
of GDP in 2005.7 These data, therefore, superficially seem to 
validate notions of large differences between the United States 
and Europe in social expenditures and in their societal models, 
perhaps even illustrating the long-term success of the 1980s 
“Reagan  revolution”  in  scaling  back  big  government  in  the 
United States.
However, focusing solely on gross social expenditure levels 
6. As described in detail in OECD (2007c, 6–11), social spending does not 
include remuneration for work, since it does not cover market transactions, 
i.e., payments in return for the simultaneous provision of services of equivalent 
value. Employer costs such as allowances toward transport, holiday pay, etc. 
are part of remuneration in this sense. Social expenditures can be in the form 
of cash benefits (e.g., unemployment benefits or pensions), social services (e.g., 
childcare or care for the elderly), and tax breaks for social purposes (e.g., for 
private healthcare plans, pensions, or children). Expenditures are divided into 
the following nine categories: 1) old age benefits—pensions, early retirement 
pensions, home help, and residential services for the elderly; 2) survivor 
benefits—pensions and funeral payments; ) incapacity-related benefits—care 
services, disability benefits, benefits accruing from occupational injuries and 
accidents, and employee sickness payments; 4) health benefits—spending 
on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, and prevention; 5) family 
benefits—child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support 
during maternity/paternity leave, and sole-parent payments; 6) active labor-
market policies—employment services, youth training programs, subsidized 
employment, and employment services for the disabled; 7) unemployment 
benefits—unemployment compensation, severance pay, and early retirement 
for labor-market reasons; 8) housing benefits—housing allowances and rent 
subsidies; and 9) other social policy areas—uncategorized cash benefits to 
low-income households and other social services and support programs such as 
food subsidies, which are prevalent in some non-OECD countries. 
7. Preliminary data are available in OECD (2008e).
is fundamentally misguided. The conceptual problem, related 
to what was illustrated in figures 2 and , concerns focusing 
only on gross public social expenditures. Presenting gross public 
social expenditure data alone is misleading because it neglects at 
least two crucial facts:8 
1.  The  tax  treatment  of  social  expenditures  matters.  Social 
expenditures  consist  of  two  types:  social  services  provi-
sion (e.g., healthcare, childcare, and care for the elderly) 
and cash benefits (e.g., pension benefits, unemployment 
benefits, and direct income support). Social expenditures 
of  the  latter  type  are  subject  to  different  tax  treatment 
across countries, as direct and indirect taxation levels vary 
wildly. In some European countries, which have high indi-
rect tax rates, such as the approximately 25 percent general 
value-added tax (VAT) on all transactions in Scandinavian 
countries, and high direct income tax levels, close to half of 
the gross social benefits the government hands out may be 
recovered in taxes.9
2.  Private  social  expenditures  almost  always  incur  some  cost 
to the government. As discussed earlier for education and 
healthcare, social expenditures may originate from either 
public or private entities. It is critically important to note, 
however, that social spending by private entities is usually 
carried out on a tax-preferred basis, which has substantial 
associated costs (so-called tax expenditures) for the govern-
ment. Tax expenditures can be thought of as the amount 
the government would have received in tax receipts if no 
tax breaks had been granted toward specific purposes.10 As 
is the case with the taxation of social benefits, the degree to 
which governments use tax breaks as a social policy instru-
ment varies greatly between the United States and Europe. 
Europe  tends  to  rely  overwhelmingly  on  “direct  public 
service provision” by the government, whereas the US has 
traditionally seen far higher levels of “social policy initia-
tives via tax breaks.” The numbers are far from trivial: In 
2006 alone the US federal government “spent” over $100 
billion in tax breaks toward private pension provision and 
8. The following section draws from OECD (2007c). Due to space con-
straints, this policy brief cannot do justice to the many data and methodologi-
cal issues and uncertainties surrounding the data in this section, which are 
extensively described in OECD (2007c). However, these issues and uncertain-
ties are not of a magnitude that will materially impact the broader conclusions 
presented in this policy brief.
9. This reasonably assumes that all cash benefits are consumed within the 
providing country’s tax jurisdiction.
10. US law defines tax expenditures as: “Revenue losses attributable to provi-
sions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential 
rate of tax, or deferral of liability.” See OMB (2007, 285ff) for a discussion of 
US federal tax expenditures. N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1                                                                                                          j aNu a r y   2 0 0 9
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$125 billion in tax preferences toward employer contribu-
tions for medical insurance premiums and medical care 
(OMB 2007, table 19.1).11 A quick, back-of-the-envelope 
calculation reveals that on these two tax breaks alone the 
US federal government spent an average of about $750 for 
each of 00 million Americans in 2006.
Figure 4 shows how great an impact a switch from gross 
public social expenditures to the more analytically useful net 
after-tax total social expenditures (both public and private) has 
on the comparative levels of social expenditures for 200 (the 
most recent data). It includes three data series: the starting point 
of gross public social expenditures (black lines), by which the 
countries are ranked on the x-axis; net public social expendi-
tures (grey bars), which adjust gross public social expenditures 
for the effects of direct and indirect taxation and the public costs 
of tax breaks toward social purposes; and net total public and 
private social expenditures (white bars), which adds net private 
11. Included in pension-related expenditures are tax expenditures toward 
employer plans, individual retirement accounts (IRAs), Keogh plans, and 
401(k) plans.
social expenditures to net public social expenditures. All data 
are presented as share of nominal GDP at market prices.12
Figure 4 shows several important things: First, as mentioned 
above, when measured by gross public social expenditures alone, 
the United States, at just over 16 percent of GDP, ranks among 
the least generous countries. Its spending is far below the levels of 
most European countries, which are often 10 percentage points 
of GDP higher in gross expenditure terms. However, figure 4 
also shows that after accounting for the effects of taxation net 
public social expenditure levels in the United States and Europe 
are  significantly  more  equal  than  suggested  by  gross  public 
expenditure levels. This is due both to the far more extensive 
12. The use of GDP at market prices was chosen to facilitate the comparison 
of gross and net expenditure levels. This choice raises some methodological 
considerations. OECD (2007c, annex ), from which these data originate, 
notes in this regard that “the construction of net social spending indicators 
involves adjusting for indirect taxation of consumption out of benefit income, 
net social expenditure is related to GDP at factor cost, as GDP at factor costs 
does not include the value of indirect taxation and government subsidies to 
private enterprises and public corporations. However, in order to facilitate 
comparison with gross social spending indicators which are usually related to 

























Figure 4     Social spending, 2003
a.  No data are available for value of tax breaks toward old-age pensions. 
b. No data are available for Luxembourg and Greece.  
Source:  OECD (007c). 
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Box 3     Efficiency in education and healthcare spending in the United States and Europe revisited
The quality of educational and healthcare services may ultimately be in the eye of the beholder, and it is far beyond the scope 
of this policy brief to perform any detailed evaluation of these services. However, when considering state-market trade-offs in 
the United States and Europe, it is nonetheless informative to compare total expenditure levels with crude but intuitive per-
formance measures in these two public policy areas, where the sectoral expenditure patterns, as seen in figures  and , differ 
substantially between the two sides of the Atlantic. In both cases, the United States allocates a substantially larger share of its 
total expenditures through the private sector.
In such an undertaking, it is important to distinguish between effectiveness and (economic) efficiency. Effectiveness in 
public policy can be conceptually defined as a scenario in which policymakers set a policy goal and achieve it (or not). One 
hypothetical, healthcare-related example of effectiveness would be that elected officials decided to make it a public policy 
priority to reduce the incidence of breast cancer. Policymakers, therefore, directly allocated resources toward this goal and 
achieved a marked reduction in breast cancer mortality rates through, for example, improved preventive measures and an 
expansion of treatment options. 
However, effectiveness is a purely goal-oriented notion—i.e., was the goal achieved or not?—and is completely separate 
from the notion of (economic) efficiency. The efficiency of any policy can be established only by considering the resources 
spent on achieving a particular goal. Continuing the example above: A particular anti–breast cancer policy—e.g., mandatory 
annual mammographic screenings provided for free to all women—may be effective, but it would not be deemed efficient if it 
required that healthcare resources be transferred away from other policies that were more effective at achieving the same goal 
of lowering breast cancer rates with the same resources. Simply throwing money at a problem may be effective, but it is almost 
never efficient.
Given that in most OECD countries the government is the monopoly supplier of healthcare and educational services and 
that because of this there are no alternative, large-scale private suppliers, it is usually impossible to compare public provision of 
services with private-sector provision of the same services at the national level. Hence one can rarely establish in much detail 
whether government provision of these services is efficient or not in healthcare or education. The lack of real counterfactuals in 
many OECD countries precludes such comparative analyses. 
It is possible, however, to take advantage of the cross-country differences in the financing of education and healthcare 
illustrated in figures  and . Using these cross-country spending differences and output variables that intuitively approximate 
effectiveness for the sector in question, it is possible to gauge, at least superficially, whether a particular country has a relatively 
more efficient total level of spending and public-private resource allocation than other countries. Such comparisons are made 
in figure B.1 for education and figures B. and B. for healthcare.
As the output variable for education (the y-axis), figure B.1 uses the total sum of graduation rates for “at least upper-second-
ary” and “at least tertiary” education in 005 for the age group 5–. This variable captures the output of educational spending 
as the share of labor-market entrants in this age group who have achieved one or both of these two educational thresholds.1 
This is a broad, quantitative measure that simply assesses the percentage of the eligible total who graduate from a country’s 
educational system; there is no attempt to adjust for the quality of a degree. As a sum of two rates, the total may exceed 100. 
The resource variable (the x-axis) is total (i.e., both public and private) educational expenditures on all educational levels. The 
size of the bubbles indicates the share of private educational expenditures in the total.
Figure B.1 shows that total educational expenditures vary from .5 percent of GDP in Greece to 8 percent in Iceland, with 
the United States close behind at 7. percent of GDP in 00. More importantly, it is evident that educational outcomes (the 
y-axis) vary widely, too, with Portugal, Italy, and Poland at the bottom, the Scandinavian countries and the United States at the 
top, and the rest of the European countries massed in the middle. The relative positions of the United States and the European 
countries indicate that the United States, in the upper right corner, has generally effective educational expenditures in relative 
terms, with high levels of expenditure and a high sum of graduation rates, but that the Scandinavian countries are more ef-
ficient by this measure in their educational expenditures than the United States. They spend fewer resources (significantly fewer 
in the case of Finland) than the United States to achieve roughly the same outcome.
(box continues on next page) 
1. The focus is on secondary and tertiary education, since primary education is compulsory in all of the countries in question and the inclusion of this 
measure would, therefore, not add any informative variation to the sample.
2. Measuring the quality of a given education is an extremely complex task and lies beyond the scope of this policy brief. See, for example, OECD (2006).N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1                                                                                                          j aNu a r y   2 0 0 9
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Of particular importance to the discussion at hand, figure B.1 also illustrates that the United States has by far the greatest 
share of private educational expenditures among the included countries (indicated by its relatively large bubble). There is very 
little to indicate that private educational expenditures are—in the broad average sense illustrated here—inherently more ef-
ficient than public educational expenditures. Figure B.1 also shows that in many European countries suffering from too little 
public investment in education there is ample room for greater private educational expenditures and that this increase would 
likely be conducive to educational effectiveness—i.e., it would raise the number of graduates.
Turning to healthcare spending, the output variable chosen for figure B. (the y-axis) is healthy life expectancy (HLE) as 
estimated by the World Health Organization (WHO). This variable was chosen because it captures the effects of a wide range 
of healthcare outcomes in just one variable. Unlike standard life expectancy estimates, which simply capture the average years 
of life in a population until death, irrespective of the condition of these years, HLE considers nonfatal health outcomes and 
provides a summary measure of population health status: HLE captures how many healthy years of life a population enjoys 
on average, rather than just the average age at which people die. Similar to figure B.1, the x-axis expenditure variable is 
total public and private healthcare expenditures, and the size of a country’s bubble indicates the share of private healthcare 
expenditures in that country.
Several things are evident in figure B.: First of all, the United States spends far more per capita—over $,000 purchasing 
power parity (PPP) more—on healthcare than any European OECD country. Second, it is immediately obvious that the US HLE 
of just 6 years in 00 is – years lower than most rich, EU-15 countries and is on par with Portugal. Yet Portugal spent a 
total of just $,11 PPP per capita on healthcare in 006, just one-third of the $6,71 PPP per capita spent by the United States. 
Third, only Greece and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland have a share of private healthcare expenditures approaching that of the 
United States. And fourth, there is a very strong statistical correlation between total healthcare expenditures and HLE in Europe, 
whereas the United States is very obviously an outlier to this trend. 
One might argue that using HLE is too broad a measure because it captures the effects of a plethora of other issues, such as 
diet, sedentary lifestyles, or smoking habits, rather than just healthcare-system outcomes. It might be better to use a measure 
more narrowly focused on the immediate result of a crucial, ubiquitous healthcare-system service (one usually requiring hos-
pitalization), namely child bearing. Infant mortality rates are probably the most widely used such healthcare-quality indicator. 
Figure B. replicates figure B. using infant mortality rates instead of HLE. 
The picture provided by figure B. is similar in many ways to that of figure B., except that the United States fares even 
worse in figure B. than in figure B.. The most recent US infant mortality rate (from 005) of 6. per 1,000 live births is worse 
than any included European country and is nearly twice the EU-15 average of  per 1,000 live births in 006, even though 
the United States spends significantly more resources on healthcare than any European country. As such, measured by infant 
mortality, the United States has an extremely wasteful and highly inefficient healthcare system. It is also noteworthy that mea-
sured by infant mortality rates, there is again a statistically significant correlation between expenditure levels and outcomes in 
Europe, while the United States remains an outlier to this trend.
In other words, a reasonably clear trade-off exists in Europe between expenditures and outcomes in healthcare, and relative 
efficiency levels are thus in the aggregate reasonably comparable: A given level of expenditure yields a given level of healthy 
life expectancies and infant mortality in Europe. Figures B. and B. make it clear that European efficiency levels, in terms of 
achieving a broadly healthy population and reducing infant mortality rates, are far above those found in the more private sec-
tor oriented US healthcare system. Indeed, figures B. and B. suggest that in efficiency terms socialized medicine in Europe 
delivers, whereas the more private sector oriented US healthcare system does not.5
. The starting points of HLE estimates are standard life tables providing the mortality level and life expectancy of a given population. Regular life expec-
tancy estimates are then augmented by estimates of the number of healthy years of life lost to circumstances associated with a comprehensive list of health 
conditions. In the WHO data used here, survey data on the incidence of 15 disease and injury categories are combined with medically determined severity 
distributions of the 15 categories and used to provide as comprehensive a picture as possible of the morbidity (rather than merely the mortality) situation 
of the included populations. Research cited in Mathers et al. (2001) found that data reliant on self-reported health status were neither compatible across 
countries nor across time periods due to differences in survey design and different cultural thresholds of sickness.
4. The y-axis in figure B. is inverted because the lowest infant mortality rate possible is the desired outcome.
5. Other broad measures of healthcare outcome yield the same overall result. For example, Nolte and McKee (2008) showed that the United States has 
the highest level of amenable mortality (i.e., the number of premature deaths from preventable causes) of 18 surveyed OECD countries, 14 of which are 
European. Meanwhile Or (2000) shows that increasing the share of public expenditure in total healthcare expenditures has significantly reduced mortality 
(particularly male mortality) in OECD countries since 1980.
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Figure B3.1     Educational expenditure and attainment
Note:  Size of bubbles indicates percent share of total educational expenditures that comes from the private sector. Relative differences between countries magnified (raised 
to the second power) to facilitate reading of the figure.
Source:  OECD (007b).
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At the same time, though, the United States is a far larger country than any in Europe, so this is not a straight apples-to-apples 
comparison. These comparative data might plausibly suggest that, in terms of healthcare provision, it just is more difficult and 
expensive to run a healthcare system that spans an entire, highly diverse continent, and smaller European countries, therefore, 
have a structural size advantage. It simply may not be possible for a more centralized, small-state healthcare system, such as that 
of Sweden, to work in the continent-sized United States, and this may explain the large cost differentials. In many ways, such 
an argument reflects the same fundamental geographic differences that also explain why it is far more expensive to provide 
nationwide broadband coverage to a vast, sparsely populated country like the United States than it is to a small and densely 
populated country like the Netherlands. 
This train of thought, however, ultimately concerns itself with the optimal size of a sovereign state as determined by the 
efficient delivery of healthcare services. Since historically states’ borders have never been determined in this way—although 
in some countries subsovereign government entities are organized in this manner, i.e., county and municipality sizes are de-
termined by their ability to support and sustain a full-service hospital—such an argument is purely academic. Moreover, the 
argument that this American exceptionalism in terms of geographic size and diversity is the cause of its high and comparatively 
inefficient healthcare costs is very different from the standard, supply-side argument that private-sector healthcare expenditures 
are inherently more efficient than public expenditures. 
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taxation of cash-benefit payments in many European countries 
and to the prevalence of costly tax breaks toward social purposes 
in the United States. It is thus noteworthy that net public social 
expenditures in all European countries are lower than the gross 
levels, in some cases significantly so, while the opposite is the case 
in the United States, where net public social expenditures are 
higher than the gross levels would suggest (the left bar is higher 
than the black line for the United States in figure 4). European 
“welfare states” are, therefore, relatively cheaper to run on an 
after-tax basis than the gross data would suggest, whereas the 
US welfare state is more expensive on an after-tax basis. Finally, 
figure 4 shows the same distribution for total social expenditures 
that figure 2 did for typically governmental functions: When 
net  private-sector  social  expenditures—which  in  the  United 
States are significantly larger than in Europe—are added to net 
public social expenditures, the total after-tax shares of societal 
resources channeled toward social purposes in the United States 
and Europe are very similar. In fact the total after-tax social 
expenditure level in the United States, at 26.4 percent of nomi-
nal GDP, is more generous than in any European country except 
France and Germany and is actually higher than the EU-1 
average of 25 percent.1 When viewed on an all-inclusive basis, 
the nominally limited US welfare state actually has a similar (or 
even greater) level of resources available to it than do most of the 
1. No data are available for Luxembourg and Greece.
Figure B3.2     Healthy life expectancy of total population and total healthcare expenditure per capita
Note:  Size of bubbles indicates percent share of total health expenditures that comes from the private sector. Relative differences between countries magnified (raised to the 
third power) to facilitate reading of figure. EU-15 average is the GDP weighted average.
Sources:  OECD (008c); WHO (008). 
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Figure B3.1     Educational expenditure and attainment
Note:  Size of bubbles indicates percent share of total educational expenditures that comes from the private sector. Relative differences between countries magnified (raised 
to the second power) to facilitate reading of the figure.
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Tax breaks and subsidized private-sector 
provision of services obscure the true 
(higher) level of total US expenditures on 
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so-called comprehensive European welfare states. 
When one follows the money rather than the rhetoric, the 
perceived differences between the total resources allocated to 
social expenditures in the United States and Europe prove to 
be illusory. As was the case with the similar levels of expendi-
ture on government tasks described earlier, this finding should 
embolden proponents of the primacy of pocketbook issues over 
ideology. Regarding social expenditures, the relatively similar 
US and EU populations, ceteris paribus, seem to demand and 
receive access to similar shares of output.
While obviously the specific target areas, intentions, and 
objectives of countries’ social expenditures are too numerous 
to even approximate, it is nonetheless worth recalling that the 
United States, despite roughly equivalent net total spending 
levels,  does  significantly  worse  than  European  countries  on 
widely used social policy indicators. The recent OECD report 
(2008d), Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in 
OECD Countries, finds that in the mid-2000s, the United States 
had  a  significantly  more  unequal  income  distribution14  and 
higher poverty levels15 than European countries.16 What matters 
is not a country’s level of total social expenditures but how and 
to the benefit of whom it spends those resources.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Kaganist proponents of a massive transatlantic divide have it 
almost entirely wrong. When it comes to the share of total 
resources spent on government tasks and social spending, after 
accounting for the effects of the tax systems and including both 
public and private-sector spending, the transatlantic differences 
between the United States and European countries are minus-
14. Income distribution was measured as the Gini coefficient for disposable 
income after taxes and transfers.
15. Poverty was measured as income at various percentages (40, 50, and 60 
percent) of the median income.
16. Only Portugal had a slightly higher Gini coefficient than the United States 
in the mid-2000s.
Figure B3.3     Infant mortality and total healthcare expenditure per capita, 2006 or latest
Note:  EU-15 average is the GDP weighted average. The y-axis is inverted because the lowest infant mortality rate possible is the desired outcome. 
Source:  OECD (008c). 
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cule. Properly measured, Mars and Venus spend the same share 
of income on these tasks. Soapbox politics aside, the dominance 
of pocketbook issues causes relatively similar populations in the 
United States and Europe to spend relatively similar shares of 
their incomes on similar tasks and services. The only meaning-
ful difference between US and European expenditure levels is in 
private-sector healthcare spending, where the US private sector 
spends about three times more on healthcare than its European 
private-sector counterparts. 
This leaves three further implications to consider. First, 
in some respects, this striking similarity of actual expenditure 
levels in the United States and Europe in areas full of ideological 
posturing is positive. It indicates that the debate about how the 
United States should reform its domestic social and economic 
institutions for the 21st century age of globalization should not 
be bogged down in disagreements about the need to spend a 
lot more on government tasks and social services, at least not 
if  European  spending  levels  are  any  guide.  Instead  the  US 
domestic reform debate should focus exclusively on how and 
for whose benefit the United States spends its already sizable 
allocated resources.
Second, tax breaks and subsidized private-sector provi-
sion of services obscure the true (higher) level of total US 
expenditures on government tasks and social spending. These 
expenditures are kept “under the radar screen,” perpetuating 
the perception that the US government (and, by implication, 
US  taxpayers)  spends  very  little  on  government  tasks  and 
social spending. This obscurity obviously benefits those groups 
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